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PSYCHIATRY AND COLORADO CRIMINAL LAW
By JOHN M. MACDONALD, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of Colorado School of
Medicine, Assistant Medical Director, Colorado Psychopathic Hospital.
"Law and legal procedures have always been a mystery to
the uninitiated, a snare to the unwary and a red rag to the
unhappy man possessed of reforming zeal."-Lord Buckmaster

The incidence of serious crime, a matter of profound public concern,
shows the need for searching inquiry in many areas including the
adequacy of present criminal legislation. When the crime is that of
murder and when the defendant's guilt is not in doubt, a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity is almost inevitable. Equally inevitable is
the battle of psychiatric witnesses whenever the state psychiatrists find
the accused to be legally sane. The public is puzzled by this disagreement
within the medical profession. Opinions differ; some persons believe
that the offender must be crazy to commit such a brutal crime; others
are alarmed at the possible abuse of the insanity plea and demand the
death penalty, while reformers insist on the need for revision of the tests
of criminal responsibility and elimination of the death penalty. The
important problem of prevention of homicide tends to be overlooked in
the midst of all this clamor. The sociopathic criminal, the prevention
of serious crime, tests of criminal responsibility and the death penalty
will be reviewed briefly from a psychiatric viewpoint.
THE SOCIOPATHIC OFFENDER

Sociopaths are social misfits who fail to conform to accepted social
customs. The manifestations of their lawlessness are protean; alcholism, drug addiction, sexual perversions, theft, assault and even homicide
may be seen. They seem unable to profit from experience or punishment
and tend to continue their criminal behavior on release from prison.
Under our "cash register" system of punishment, the convicted sociopath
is sent to a penitentiary for a varying number of years depending on the
number of citizens he has assaulted. Short sentences do not change his
pattern of behavior. Harsh punitive sentences serve only to increase his
resentment toward society. Rarely his incarceration may lead to his
rehabilitation; more often, however, it serves only to complete any deficiencies in his knowledge of safecracking, assault or other forms of
crime. He may acquire for the first time the habit of taking drugs, which,
the writer understands from criminal acquaintances, are often available
within prison walls.
Detention alone for a stated period of time means all too often that
dangerous persons are released to continue their criminal behavior. From
their ranks come a significant percentage of the murderer population.
A recent study of 588 cases of criminal homicide in Philadelphia
showed that 64 per cent of the murderers had previous arrest records,
that of these, 66 per cent had a record of offenses against the person,
and that of these, 73 per cent had a record of aggravated assault. Many
of the persons previously arrested were convicted but given relatively
light sentences and probably little constructive atetntion. That two out
*Published at the request of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
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of three of these murderers had previous arrest records shows the need to
recognize early and treat more carefully the potential homicide offenders.'
This study did not report on the incidence of sociopathy but local experience suggests a high incidence of this disorder among murderers with
previous arrest records.
Unfortunately our society makes little provision for treatment of the
aggressive sociopath. The inadequacy or deviation or failure to adjust to
ordinary social life is not a mere wilfulness or badness which can be
threatened or thrashed out of the individual but constitutes a true illness
which should be treated." The relatives of a sociopath may recognize the
need for treatment and attempt to secure commitment to a mental hospital. Involuntary commitment is often essential as the sociopath seldom
seeks help, unless he is facing a prison sentence. Under Colorado Civil
Law, he is eligible for commitment "for his own welfare or for the
welfare or safety of others." Medical commissions, however, rarely commit the sociopath as he is not psychotic. Yet the commitment laws make
no reference to clinical diagnosis and there is no provision in the law
restricting commitment to persons suffering from psychosis. The reluctance of medical commissions to commit the sociopath (unless he is also
a chronic alcoholic) is perhaps understandable in view of the overcrowding and shortage of psychiatrists in our state mental hospital. This
problem might be remedied by construction of another hospital in Denver and by increasing the salaries of physicians to levels offered by other
states.
A partial solution to the problem of recidivism and the sociopathic
offender would be the introduction of an "indeterminate sentence" law
in Colorado. Many states have enacted indeterminate sentence laws
under which the sentence imposed by the court is for an indeterminate
period and the exact time of the defendant's release is decided upon
later by an administrative board. The principal argument in favor of
indeterminate sentence laws is that it is not desirable to decide at the
outset how long a person should remain in confinement, but that it is
advantageous to watch the development of his personality, his adaptability to training, and his desire and will to become rehabilitated, and
to reach a decision as to when his release date should come on the basis
of the progress of events.' An indeterminate sentence law to be effective
1 Wolfgang,
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must offer something more than punishment. The offender should
be sent to prison as punishment and not for punishment. While he is in
custody every effort should be made to modify his pattern of antisocial
behavior.
Under the indeterminate sentence law in California, the Adult Authority, a seven member board appointed by the Governor, has the responsibility for setting sentence, fixing terms and paroling inmates of
Department of Corrections institutions. The penal code requires that the
Department of Corrections provide "a scientific study of each prisoner,
his career and life history, the cause of his criminal acts and recommendations for his care, training and employment with a view to his reformation and the protection of society."
The average length of time required for a clinical case study ranges
from six to ten weeks. During this time each inmate undergoes an extensive period of psychological testing in a reception-guidance center.
Inmates with serious behavioral or emotional problems are examined by
a psychiatrist. On completion of the study, each inmate is transferred to
an appropriate institution in the department. The findings of the
reception-guidance center are used by the institution to which the inmate
is assigned in understanding the man and his problems and helping him
to participate in a program that will help to correct his deficiencies.
The Department of Corrections includes among its institutions the
"California Medical Facility" which has as its primary purpose the confinement, treatment and care of inmates who are mentally abnormal
including sociopathic offenders. The Medical Facility differs from the
usual prison in that the superintendent is a physician and that special
emphasis is given to psychological treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists. The mainstay of the program is group psychotherapy.
The Patuxent Institution in Maryland has as its aim the treatment
and rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Offenders who have shown
persistent antisocial or criminal behavior and who, on examination
after conviction of a crime, are found to be sociopaths are committed to
this institution. The prisoner is confined and treated under an indeterminate sentence and the length of time he stays is determined not so much
by what crime was committed but by his readiness to rejoin society.
Inmates who do not respond to treatment may be transferred to a
penitentiary. The director is a psychiatrist and the professional staff
includes psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers.
The first combined penal and psychiatric facility of this type was
established near Copenhagen in 1935. The medical superintendent
claims that 50 per cent of the detainees return to normal life in the
community.
It is hoped that Colorado will follow the lead set by California and
Maryland. An experimental center could be set up within the Colorado
State Penitentiary to provide for psychiatric treatment of a small number
of sociopathic offenders. A major advantage of such a treatment center
would be the valuable experience gained by prison guards assigned to
the center. In time, the lessons learned within the center would have a
beneficial influence on the prison as a whole. This has been the experience in California.
The Childrens' Diagnostic Center established at the University of
Colorado Medical Center by an act of the legislature in 1955, provides
for psychiatric examination of juvenile delinquents and emotionally
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disturbed children upon the order of the county judge. Specialized psychiatric treatment may be indicated but is not always available within
the state due to a lack of trained staff and suitable facilities. The
center does, however, perform a valuable service by providing expert
guidance for the courts and by contributing to the early treatment of
potential sociopathic offenders.
TESTS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

In almost all of the states the tests of criminal responsibility are
based on the M'Naghten rules formulated in England in 1843. These
rules state in essence, that in order to establish a defense of insanity, it
must be shown that the accused "was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong." In Colorado and some other states, the
"right-wrong test" has been supplemented by the "irresistible impulse"
test and the "ability to adhere to the right and refrain from doing the
wrong" test.
The Colorado rules may be criticized on four grounds. Firstly,
many psychiatrists object because they are required to make a moral
decision in applying the tests. That the determination of criminal responsibility is a moral decision is freely acknowledged by the courts. The
psychiatrist would prefer to give a medical opinion and leave the moral
decision entirely to the jury. The medical opinion would involve a review of the findings of a thorough psychiatric examination in terms which
would be within the understanding of a jury of lay persons.
A second objection to Colorado procedure is that the psychiatrist in
forming his opinion is not permitted to consider hearsay material. This
means that he is not permitted to consider information obtained frin
relatives or from previous medical records of the accused. Guttmacher
comments that the courts of Colorado are notorious for their extreme
position in this matter. There are many jurisdictions that have far
more liberal and enlightened procedural rules. The Colorado procedure
inflicts a particular burden on psychiatrists who appear as witnesses for
the State as they are required to testify according to the strict letter of
the law. The courts, however, sometimes relax the rule when psychiatrists testify upon behalf of the defendant.
The third major defect of the Colorado rules is that a person who is
found not guilty by reason of insanity may be released from the hospital
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within a short period even though there may have been no significant
change in his mental condition. Thus a person who pleads insanity may
be found sane by the psychiatrists at the Pueblo State Hospital. If the
jury rejects their finding, the accused is committed to the Pueblo State
Hospital. When his lawyer requests his release the Pueblo psychiatrists
must certify that he is sane. Yet the person though legally sane by
medical standards may be a menace to society by reason of mental disease which does not amount to legal insanity. Thus after less than a
year in custody following a serious crime he may be set free to continue
his criminal activities.
The fourth defect arises from the fact that a person may be found
not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the State Hospital in
the absence of his conviction of the crime charged. The possibility
exists that an innocent person may be held responsible for a crime and
that the guilty person may escape detection because further police action
is prevented.
An escapee from a mental hospital in another state was arrested on
a charge of murder and over his strenuous objections his attorney entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. During his hospital stay
he was steadfast in maintaining his innocence. In this case, the murder
charge was later withdrawn and the possibility of wrongful commitment
on the basis of an insanity plea was avoided.
In contrast to the Colorado rules stands the Durham decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Under this
decision an accused is not held criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. "Disease" is
defined as a condition which is capable of either improving or deteriorating, and "defect" as a condition which is not considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital,
or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental
disease.
Roche believes that the product question can only be answered
affirmatively or not at all. "The psychiatrist can do no more than say
that a causal connection invariably exists, for no other reason than that
in his experience and within his psychological model he has never encountered a case where outward behavior was unrelated to inward
mental life-at best the product question can only remain within the
realm of moral definitions." He submits that if the product question is
withheld from the expert and confined to the jury, psychiatry can
function properly.!
Some psychiatrists mistakenly believe that the Durham rule frees the
psychiatrist from having to answer questions based on the "right-wrong,"
"irresistible impulse" and "the ability to adhere to the right and refrain
from doing the wrong" tests. This is not correct as expert witnesses are
liable under the Durham rule to examination and cross examination on
these points. However, the physician in giving his opinion, and the jury
in reaching their verdict are not restricted within the confines of these
criteria.
Premature release from hospital is prevented by a law requiring that
anyone acquitted by reason of insanity be committed to a mental hospital
4 Roche, The Criminal Mind (1958).
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until the superintendent certifies that the person has recovered his
sanity and that he is no longer a danger to the community. Release is
subject to approval by the court.
The Durham rule has been criticized because it does not provide a
precise definition of insanity, but as Sobeloff emphasizes, what we ought
to fear is not the absence of a definition but a false definition. The
medical profession would be baffled if asked to write into the legal code
universally valid criteria for the diagnosis of the many types of psychotic
illness which may seriously disturb a person's responsibility and even if
this were attempted, the diagnostic criteria would have to be rewritten
from time to time with the progress of psychiatric knowledge.'
The fear has been expressed that juries will abuse the discretion
granted to them and acquit persons who should probably be punished.
Statistics from the District of Columbia show that from 1952 to 1955,
the three-year period before the Durham rule became effective, 0.8 per
cent of felony trials resulted in verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity.
In a similar period since the rule has become effective, the percentage
has increased to 1.6 per cent. Such an increase, as Guttmacher points out,
is not sufficiently momentous to lead to the conclusion that the Durham
rule threatens to undermine the criminal law, or that it inspires the
susceptible to become felons.'
The advantages of the Durham rule have been stated by Mr. Justice
Douglas. "The Durham rule aids the jury in a solution of the problem
by letting the psychiatrist talk, unfettered by arbitrary legal formulae.
The psychiatrist will be free to present his testimony about the mental
condition of the accused in concepts that are familiar to him and medically realistic. The psychiatrist merely expounds on the theoretical and
clinical aspects of the problem. The jury evaluates his testimony, as it
does the evidence on every other factual issue. That is the correct disposition, for the question whether society should assess punishment for
criminal conduct is, in the last analysis, a moral judgment. The jury,
being of the community, reflects its attitudes and speaks for it."7
THE DEATH PENALTY

Advocates of the death penalty draw attention to the Old Testament
teaching of a life for a life, argue that death is more humane than long
imprisonment and claim that if the deterrent effect of the death penalty
were removed more murders would be committed.
Opponents of the death penalty refer to a later text in the Old
Testament (Ezekiel 33:11. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no
pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his
way and live.") and also emphasize the New Testament teaGhing which
forbids the taking of life by way of retribution. Capital punishment,
according to Gardiner, surrounds trials for murder with an atmosphere
of morbid press sensationalism which panders to the sadistic impulses of
mankind, and itself lessens public respect for the sanctity of human life.
A deep reverence for human life is worth more than a thousand executions in the prevention of murder; it is, in fact, the great security of
5 Whitehorn, Report to the Governor's Conmission on Legal Psychiatry, Maryland.
'Guttmacher, Guilty or Insane? A New Test. Nation, 186:229 (1958).
7 Douglas, Law and Psychiatry (1956).
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human life. The law of capital punishment, whilst pretending to support this reverence does in fact tend to destroy it.'
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment after studying
statistics from many countries including the United States concluded
that there is no clear evidence that the abolition of capital punishment
has led to an increase in the homicide rate or that its re-introduction has
led to a fall. That the public is not generally in favor of the death
penalty is shown by the infrequency with which juries impose the death
penalty. Curiously enough more murderers commit suicide than are put
to death by legal execution.'
Gowers is doubtless correct in his assumption that emotion rather
than reason will decide the issue of the death penalty.*
8Bright,

J., cited by Gardiner, Capitol Punishment as a Deterrent
9 See note 1, supra.

(London 1956).
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